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Abstract—Lattice based cryptography is claimed as a serious
candidate for post quantum cryptography, it recently became
an essential tool of modern cryptography. Nevertheless, if lattice
based cryptography has made theoretical progresses, its chances
to be adopted in practice are still low due to the cost of the
computation. If some approaches like RSA and ECC have been
strongly optimized - in particular their core arithmetic operations,
the modular multiplication and/or the modular exponentiation lattice based cryptography has not been arithmetically improved.
This paper proposes to fill the gap with a new approach using
Residue Number Systems, RNS, for one of the core arithmetic
operation of lattice based cryptography: namely solving the
Closest Vector Problem (CVP).
Keywords—Residue Number System; Base Conversions; Lattice;
Closest Vector Problem

I.

I NTRODUCTION

The cryptography based on lattices appeared at the beginning of this century with initial propositions like GGH [12]
and NTRU [14].
In few years, due to some properties of the lattices, some
powerful cryptographic tools have been proposed for the
first time: fully homomorphic encryption, multi-linear map
and indistinguishability obfuscation [10]. Despite numerous
attacks against the historical propositions, countermeasure after
countermeasure, these systems are still available [8]. Even
after numerous evolutions, they stay based on some simple
proposals where the encryption is obtained by adding an
”error” to a vector of a lattice. This error represents the original
message, and the vector obtained the ciphered one. All the
security is based on the difficulty to reduce the public basis
of the lattice in a Lovàsz reduced basis in which the Babaı̈
algorithms can be performed [1].
Some recent approaches propose to use an oracle which
gives some approximated closest vectors [16], [11], [20], and
a Learning with Error method to find the closest vector.
Nevertheless, they are not still sufficiently efficient in practice.
Thus, an efficient computation of a closest vector remains a
real challenge. As the Residue Number System (RNS) has
been proved to be efficient for other cryptographic systems
† supported by Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA).

[13], [7], we suggest to study in this paper their use in lattice
cryptography by implementing in RNS the Babaı̈ Round-Off
CVP method.
II.

A BOUT BABA Ï ROUND -O FF CVP

The main idea can be summarized in the following way.
We create a lattice of full-rank ` from a strongly reduced
basis given by a matrix G, and we construct another bad basis
(in terms of lattice basis reduction) H = U G, U being a
unimodular matrix. H can be in Hermite Normal Form [17].
The encryption mode [12] obeys the following scheme:
c = (m + kH) where m is the vector message composed of
zeros and ones (or of small values with respect to the Lovàsz
conditions), k is a vector such that c = (c1 , 0, ..., 0) with
c1 huge, or c = (c1 , c2 , ..., c` ), with small ci ’s. The vector
kH belongs to the lattice, and is a closest vector of c. In
the following, we will consider that all the coefficients of
c are positive, which is possible modulo a translation via a
vector of the lattice. As the coefficients of m are small and
G is strongly orthogonal, the message m is found using the
Rounding Off algorithm
of Babaı̈ [1]. This

 operation is given
by m = c − cG−1 × G, where cG−1 × G represents the
closest vector of the lattice. Since m is composed
of small val
ues, it is suggested to compute c − cG−1 × G mod β where
β is a small number, reducing by this way the complexity
of the calculus. Nevertheless, though matrix G is an integer
−1
matrix,
 −1 its inverse G is not, i.e., is rational. The operation
must be done sufficiently precisely for obtaining a
cG
good rounding.
III.

T HE RNS APPROACH OF THE ROUNDING O FF BABA Ï
ALGORITHM

In this work, we propose for this evaluation to use RNS
systems which distribute the calculus on small values in a fully
parallel way for additions and multiplications [24], [23]. These
representations are based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
a number α is represented by its residues (α1 , ..., αn ) modulo
a set of coprimes (m1 , ..., mn ) called the RNS base. Hence,
we
Qn are able to represent all the values from 0 to M − 1 =
i=1 mi − 1.
978-1-4799-4833-8/14/$31.00 c 2014 IEEE

In this approach we use the modular reduction proposed by
P. Montgomery [18] and
to RNS [19], [15], [2], both
 adapted

for the evaluation of cG−1 × G, and for the final reduction
modβ.


Our first purpose is to compute the value cG−1 in
RNS. For this, we will transform this calculus in complete
integer operation using that G0 = (det G) × G−1 is an
integer
when G is one integer matrix. Thus we have:
j 0 mmatrix
 −1 
cG
.
det G = cG
In RNS, the division by det G is possible if it is an exact
one and if det G is co-prime with the RNS Base. In this case
we have,


cG0 − (cG0 mod det G)
cG0
=
.
det G
det G
j 0 m
cG
, we will compute more
As we want to compute det
j 0
k
j 0 Gm
cG
1
cG
precisely det G + 2 v1 = det G , where v1 is the all-one
vector (i.e. v1 = (1, 1, ..., 1)).
If we develop this expression, we obtain:
j 0 m j 0
k
cG
1
cG
=
+
v
det G
det G
2 1

=

0

0

2cG +det G.v1 −[(2cG +det G.v1 ) mod (2 det G)]
2 det G

Algorithm 1 PreBabaı̈ROff rns(option)
Input: a = c × G” + v”, a ∈ Zn given in the two bases B1
and B2 , |a|∞ < M1 × DG , 2DG < M2 , all the values
concerned by G are considered as precomputed.
Output: [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG ] in B1 and B2 if (option = rns), else modβ.
1: q1 ← (−DG )−1 × a1 in B1 (in other words, the evaluation
is made modulo M1 ),
2: q2 ← q1 Extension1 from B1 to B2 of q1 ,
−1
3: r2 ← (a2 + DG × q2 ) × M1 in base B2 ,
hence r2 ≡ (2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG , with |r2 |∞ < 2DG

4:

Extension2 of r2 in B1 if rns else modulo β.

B. Analysis of the first extension

.

The most delicate operation is due to the modulo mod
(2 det G), which requires in RNS a particular attention. The
other operations can be directly implemented in RNS as is.
We note DG = (2 det G).
A. Evaluation of [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG ] in RNS
In this part, we consider the RNS bases B1 and B2 with
Y
Y
M1 =
m and M2 =
m. To compute a reduction of
m∈B1

M1 , thus, in state 3, the division by M1 is equivalent to a
multiplication by its inverse. This last operation is possible
in the base B2 , since M1 is coprime to M2 . Thus, base
extensions are needed and correspond to states 2 and 4. Then,
we obtain the value r2 ≡ [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG ], with
|r2 |∞ < 2DG , which is converted in B1 or modulo β with
respect to the option.

m∈B2

the form a mod DG , the bases are selected such that |a|∞ <
M1 × DG and 2DG < M2 , assuming that DG is coprime with
the elements of B1 (which is generally the case, because det G
is frequently a prime number).
The modular reduction can be done in RNS using the
Montgomery algorithm [2]. The particularity of the approach
is that the reduced value is obtained multiplied by a factor
depending of the RNS base (in our case M1−1 ). When some
values are fixed, G in our case, we can use precomputed
values to avoid this extra final factor M1−1 . Thus, we let
denote by
G” = 2G0 × M1 mod DG
(recall that G−1 is not integer, but G0 = (det G)G−1 is),
and v” = (M1 × det G)v1 mod DG .
The ”PreBabaı̈ROffrns” has two modes, the rns one which
gives the result on B1 and B2 , and the one without option
which gives the result modulo β adapted to a cryptographic
context. This algorithm uses the Montgomery reduction in the
states 1 and 3 of the procedure. The state 1 computes q1
modulo M1 such that (a2 + DG × q2 ) gives a multiple of

For Extension1 we need to extend q1 exactly. A first
solution could be to use an intermediate representation: Mixed
Radix System [23]. However it is costly to compute, because the transformation from RNS to MRS involves lots of
dependancies between intermediary results, which somehow
breaks the parallelization provided by RNS. So we can replace
steps 2 and 3 by an approach using extensions based on the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Such extension is performed as following: for a tuple of residues (x mod m)m∈B1 ,
P
−1
1
− αM1 , where α ∈
then x =
(x mod m) × M
m m
m

m∈B1

[0, |B1 |−1]. α can be computed in different ways. In particular,
it can be forgotten for first base extension [2] in algorithm
3. In this case, we propose a solution to reduce the final
result in [0, 2DG ) (like for classical Montgomery reduction)
before applying second base extension. For that we use an
extra modulo m
b to recover α.
(We recall that DG = (2 det G).)
Algorithm 2 Extension1 Bis
Input: q1 in B1 , a2 in B2 and am
b
b = a mod m.
Output: r20 ≡ aM1−1 m
b −1 mod DG , r20 < 2DG .
−1
X
M1
M1
1: q2 ←
q1,i
in B2 ,
mi mi
mi
m∈B1

qm
b ←

X
m∈B1

q1,i

M1
mi

−1

mi

mi m
i

M1
mod m
b
mi

r2 ← (a2 + DG × q2 ) × M1−1 in B2 and
−1
rm
mod m,
b
b ← (am
b + DG × qm
b ) × M1
−1
3: qb ← (−DG ) rm
b
b mod m
4: Extension of qb in B2 is just a duplication if m
b is smaller
than all the elements of B2
5: r20 ← (r2 + DG × qb) × m
b −1 in base B2

2:

In step 1, q2 = q1 + αM1 , thus

r2

= (a2 + DG × q2 ) × M1−1
= (a2 + DG × (q1 + αM1 )) × M1−1
= (a2 + DG × q1 ) × M1−1 + αDG
≡ am
b −1 mod DG .

Because size of base B1 has been chosen
such that a < M1 × DG , it is then clear that
(a + DG × q1 )/M1 = (a2 + DG × q2 )/M1−1 mod M2
= r2 < (2 + α)DG .
Hence we need to reduce it a second time. For that we use
the extra modulo m
b and we apply a second Montgomery
reduction computing
qb, thus

r20 ≡ a2 × M1−1 × m
b −1 mod DG with r20 < 2DG when
m
b > |B1 | + 1 ≥ 2 + α.
We replace M1 by M10 = M1 × m.
b Hence, the precomputed
values become
G” = 2G0 × M10 mod DG
and v” = (M10 × det G)v1 mod DG .
C. Analysis of the second extension
For the second base extension, we can use an extra modulo
m
b with a Shenoy-Kumaresan approach [21]. But in this case,
we cannot extract any information about the comparison of
r20 with DG . Thus, we obtain r20 = (2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod
DG or [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG ] + DG which is still not
satisfying for our purpose.
Hence, the second extension can be done in MRS which is
a positional number system. In this case, during the conversion,
a comparison with DG is possible and if necessary we subtract
DG .
D. Complete ”Round-Off” Closest Vector in RNS
Now, we come back to our problem which is to compute a
closest vector with round-off formula: cG−1 × G. First we
give a new version of the PreBabaı̈ROff rns including the new
extension.
Algorithm 3 NewPreBabaı̈ROff rns(option)
Input: a = c × G” + v”, a ∈ Zn given in the bases B1 , B2
and m,
b |a|∞ < M1 × DG , 2DG < M2 , all the values
concerned by G are considered as precomputed.
Output: [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod DG ] in B1 and B2 if (option = rns), else modβ.
1: q1 ← (−DG )−1 × a1 in B1 (in other words, the evaluation
is made modulo M1 ),
2: r20 ← Extension1 Bis(q1 , B1 , B2 , m),
b
3: r
e2 ← r20 conversion in mixed radix,
4: Comparison of re2 with (2 det G),
5: Extension of r
e2 in B1 if rns else modulo β,
6: Subtraction of DG if necessary.


NewPreBabaı̈ROff rns algorithm gives cG−1 in bases
B1 and B2 or modulo β with respect to the option, with as
input a = c × G” + v” where G” = 2G0 × M10 mod DG and
v” = (M10 × det G)v1 mod DG . Thus we propose
 the follow
ing procedure for computing the Closest Vector cG−1 × G.

Algorithm 4 Babaı̈ROff rns(option)
Input: c ∈ Zn the ciphertext given in B1 , B2 and m,
b all the
values concerned by G are considered as precomputed.
Output: [(2cG0 + (det G)v1 ) mod (2 det G)], if (option =
rns) then in the two RNS bases B1 and B2 , else modulo
β (that is true for all the calculus of this procedure).
1: a ← c × G” + v” in B1 , B2 and m,
b
2: b ← NewPreBabaı̈ROff rns(a, B1 , B2 , m),
b
3: r ← (a − b)(2 det G)−1 in B1 , B2 and m.
b
IV.

OVERALL COMPLEXITY OF RNS ROUND - OFF CVP
METHOD

A. About the size of RNS bases B1 and B2
The main interest of RNS is that it allows to perform
computations on large integers independantly on residues
having a size which can be chosen and adapted to practical
considerations, e.g. in the case of implementation into some
embedded systems. A basic RNS product being composed of
independant modular products modulo each element of the
RNS base, these ones are chosen having a particuliar form
which guarantee efficient modular multiplications, e.g. 2t − ci
with ci < 2t/2 [6], [5]. Hence, the complexities of algorithms
are given in terms of numbers of elementary modular products.
In order to simplify analysis of algorithms and because it
provides more modularity for practical implementations, RNS
digits are considered having the same size in the two bases B1
and B2 required for RNS Montgomery reductions.
More precisely, since a = c × G” + v”, with G” and v”
reduced modulo DG , and because M1 must verify M1 >
|a|∞ /DG , then it sufficies to have M1 > ` × |c|∞ + 1.
Now, recalling that c = m + kH and that log(max |Hi,j |) ∈
O(log(det G)) (e.g. when H = HN F (G) with det G prime),
both sizes of B1 and B2 are identical, i.e. M1 , M2 > DG . So
we will consider that |B1 | = |B2 | = k.
B. Complexity of Round-off step
a) Matrix multiplication approach for first extension:
Extension1 Bis, based on CRT, can be seen as a matrix mul(s)
tiplication. Let’s denote qi,j the j-th residue of qi for s-th
coefficient of vector a (i.e. i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ [1, k], s ∈ [1, `]),
(i)
(2)
1
mj the j-th modulus of base Bi , Mi,j = M(1)
mod mj ,and
mi

(s)

ξj

(s)

−1
= q1,j M1,j

mj

. Then the first extension can be efficiently

reduced to the following matrix product:
 (1)
 (1)

(1) 
(1)


q2,1
.
.
.
(`)
q2,1

..

..
..

q2,k
.
.
.
(`)
q2,k

=

ξ1
.
.
.
(`)
ξ1

..
..
..

ξk
.
.
.
(`)
ξk

×

M1,1
.
.
.
Mk,1

..
..
..

M1,k
.
.
.
Mk,k

If k is chosen to be dividing `, i.e. ` = k × n, then the
product can be performed by using n optimised (and parallelizable) Strassen’s like square matrix multiplications [22]. More
precisely, the complexity can be reduced to O(nk 2+ = `k 1+ )
multiplications ( ∼ 0.8074 for Strassen’s technique), instead
of O(`k 2 ) when ` standard CRT based extensions are done.
Other steps of Extension1 Bis only require 4k` (resp. 3`)
multiplications in B2 (resp. mod m).
b

!

b) Second extension: A bottleneck of classical Montgomery reduction approach is that the obtained result is not
totally reduced. As seen before, it is still the case in RNS.
Hence a comparison between r20 and DG must be performed
in order to correctly execute the rounding step of Babaı̈
CVP method, and to recover exaclty the original plaintext.
A solution is then to compute the coefficients of r20 into
the MRS associated to base B2 . This transformation needs
` × k(k−1)
multiplications for the whole vector r20 . Then, a
2
direct comparison between MRS coefficients of r20 and DG is
possible, and a subtraction executed if necessary.
Associated to the use of Horner’s rule to compute the exact
result into B1 (resp. modβ), the second extension has a cost
(resp. ` × (k+2)(k−1)
) multiplications.
of ` × 3k(k−1)
2
2

[3]

[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]

[8]

[9]

Comparing to first extension, we see that this MRS based
extension is a bottleneck for the RNS approach.
[10]

c) Complexity of algorithm 4: Steps 1 and 3 of the
Round-off algorithm 4 are just usual independant RNS operations, each of them costing respectively (2k + 1)`2 and
(2k + 1)` multiplications.
The complexity of NewPreBabaı̈ROff rns algorithm is
determined by the necessity to get back to a positional number
system to perform a comparison. Although its complexity of
O(`k 2 ) appears to be dominated by the one of vector-matrix
computations in step 1, these products can be performed in
a fully parallel way, contrary to MRS extensions which are
naturally sequential.
C. Complexity of full RNS Round-off CVP procedure

[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]

[16]

Because modulus β has been chosen such that 2 × |m|∞ <
β, the round-off procedure just has to provide the value of
bcG−1 e modulo β. Once we get it, it remains to multiply it to
G mod β and to subtract the product to the ciphertext in order
to recover the original plaintext m. This ultimate vector-matrix
product has then just a cost of `2 multiplications modβ.

[17]

Finally, we get an asymptotic complexity of O(k`2 ) elementary modular multiplications for a full decryption using
the proposed RNS method.

[20]

V.

C ONCLUSION

One interesting feature of this approach comes from the
formulae of the Extension1 Bis which can be decomposed in
matrix products where some fast algorithms like the Strassen
one [22] can be used. The main drawback of the current
version is due to the necessity to compute exactly the result
of the NewPreBabaı̈ROff rns. The solution of using MRS is
not efficient, it would be more interesting to use a ShenoyKumaresan approach where the formulae are similar to the
ones of Extension1 Bis.
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